It is common to maintain cordial official and personal relations. Of particular importance were the representative activities of ambassadors and other important officials in this field, the entertainment of foreign officials in Washington, and the participation of our representatives in cultural events, exhibitions and conferences sponsored by the various governments of South Asia. Recently, the Army sent Major-General A. G. Trudeau, Deputy Chief of staff of the G-2, and a small group to India and Pakistan to establish and renew contacts in those countries on a more personal basis. On the occasion of a visit by Vice-Admiral Wright (CINCNELM) to India during this period, the US ambassador did not consider our relations with India to be friendly enough to justify his request for permission to enter the flagship [page 1139] (USS Pittsburgh). During his visit, Admiral Wright received only the bare minimum of the usual courtesies from the Indian officials he met. New Delhi`s policy is rightly to work towards an agreement with a powerful neighbor. If this is not possible quickly, which is probably not the case, the alternative is patience, vigilance, adaptability and calm determination.
It is certainly not a question of giving an ideological example to other Asian states or leading them on some crusade, or of interpreting Chinese aggression in the "perspective" most acceptable to the United States. (vi) Paragraph 49. "Encourage Pakistan`s participation in any advocacy group deemed to serve the interests of the United States. The creation of such an agreement between Pakistan and Turkey should be a priority. Ambassador Allen recently visited the United States and made a very strong appeal to congressional committees, official bodies and public gatherings for U.S. economic aid to India. We consider such support to be very important in order to maintain friendly elements in power. Until last fall, however, US policy continued to make a some distinction between a "non-aligned" India and Pakistan, a US ally. Although India also received some military assistance from the US under a mutual defence assistance agreement signed in 1951 (reaffirmed in 1958) – without accepting any of the obligations arising from an allied US policy– it generally retained a substantial difference between an ally and a neutral on the issue of direct military aid.
An ally was qualified to receive military support on a scale that the United States considered justified in light of that country`s obligations under the Alliance; On the whole, a neutral was not entitled to adequate military assistance. However, this remaining distinction between Pakistan and "non-aligned" India also disappeared last fall when border disputes between India and China erupted into an armed confrontation. In the case of Kashmir, on the other hand, the Indian logic has been conveniently reversed. There, the Indian army invaded the state on the basis of a membership certificate signed by the Hindu Maharaja against the well-known will of the 80% of Kashmiri population who are Muslims. In fact, by the time the Maharaja signed this document, his armies were retreating against the popular forces, and he himself had fled the state capital of Srinagar and sought refuge in Jammu. At that time, when his complaint in Kashmir had practically ceased to function, the Maharaja asked for help from the Indian armed forces. This was offered quickly, but on the condition that his state of India had joined him, after which he was persuaded to sign an instrument of accession. (Based on this document, India continues to claim "sovereignty" over Kashmir.) After that, Indian forces entered, took possession of most of Kashmir and have held it ever since.
A repeated promise by Mr. Nehru that India would let the people of Kashmir decide whether india or Pakistan would join a free referendum has yet to be kept. Pakistan was agitated when it demanded that India use these weapons against Pakistan and that India was more prone to communists than was the reason for the expansion of this aid. Pakistan`s uncertainty about US_ that the US was more inclined toward non-aligned India than its ally_ prompted it to look for other places, and so Pakistan sought to forge cordial relations with China and the Soviet Union. The United States took this change very badly and could not assess the real motive behind it. Further disagreements grew as U.S. aid to Pakistan dwindled and was completely halted during the 1965 war. During the 1965 war, the United States imposed an embargo on the provision of aid to Pakistan and India and took a neutral stance. Pakistan was seriously injured by this decision, as India received military aid from the Soviet Union as usual, while Pakistan`s ally _united states_ ceased its aid. Paragraph 52. "Support the maintenance of the (Afghan) government in its current form in the absence of conditions under which a more representative government could emerge without the serious threat of chaos or the emergence of power from a group subservient to the Soviet Union." The recent AGREEMENT between the United States and Pakistan on Defence Assistance is an important step towards full cooperation between Pakistan in the event of a general war.
In East Pakistan, communists and the opposition party have stoked anti-American sentiment by accusing the government of selling Pakistan`s sovereignty for the promise of U.S. aid, and by tying the U.S. to the imposition of the governor`s regime in East Bengal. Vigorous efforts are being made to expand the limited capabilities of the USIS in East Pakistan. Paragraph 57. "To strive to maintain the friendly relationship between [page 1147] the United States and Ceylon, which continues despite the burdens imposed by the Ceylon rubber trade with Communist China." On 4 April 1949, the Foreign Ministers of 12 countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty at the Ministerial Auditorium in Washington D.C: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. However, enlargement was provided for in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that accession is open to any "European State capable of promoting the principles of this Treaty and contributing to the security of the North Atlantic region". .